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ABSTRACT 
While Schopenhauer is well-known for his pessimistic outlook on life, I argue that not all 
aspects of his philosophical project support this outlook.  Specifically, I argue that 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetic genius must necessarily affirm life through artistic creation.  To show 
that this is the case, I contend that the aesthetic genius’ engagement with the world of 
representation precludes him from engaging in the denial of the will-to-live, and that his desire to 
communicate his knowledge of the world entails an affirmation of the will-to-live.  I furthermore 
outline and explore significant parallels between artistic creation and procreation, which I 
believe strengthen my reading of the aesthetic genius as one who affirms life.  These claims lead 
me to conclude that the aesthetic genius affirms the will-to-live by seeking to create something 
that immortalizes his knowledge of the nature of things—that is, by giving birth to what 
Schopenhauer calls “immortal children.”  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
If Schopenhauer is known for anything, it is his pessimistic outlook on life, especially the 
life of the human being.  It is not unusual to find Schopenhauer musing on the shortcomings and 
vices of our existence or expounding reasons why life exacts a great toll from us while providing 
little benefit in return.  While we may be the paragon of animals, we experience life as “a 
troubled dream,” and “[e]verything in life proclaims that earthly happiness is destined to be 
frustrated, or recognized as an illusion” (WWR, II, 573).  Just as we wake to sleep, and take our 
waking slow, we are born only to realize that we must die, but not until we have endured a life 
defined by suffering and strife.  In that we are, in essence, beings who will that our lives continue 
despite this realization, our experience of life is a mosaic of ever-successive desires to maintain 
life, which, even when satisfied, provide inadequate recompense for the sea of troubles we must 
navigate before we finally meet with death.  In Schopenhauer’s words: “Every breath we draw 
wards off death that constantly impinges on us.  In this way, we struggle with it every second, 
and again at longer intervals through every meal we eat, every sleep we take, every time we 
warm ourselves, and so on,” and through it all it remains the case that “death must triumph, for 
by birth it has already become our lot, and it plays with its prey only for a while before 
swallowing it up” (WWR, I, 311).  For Schopenhauer, the fact that human beings are creatures 
made to recognize their own mortality is proof enough that there is “a sentence of condemnation 
on the will-to-live which comes from the hands of nature herself” (WWR, II, 574).   
But is Schopenhauer’s philosophy consistently pessimistic?  This question may seem 
obtuse to some, especially in light of the fact that Schopenhauer maintains that his entire project 
successfully communicates “a single thought” of “the most perfect unity” (WWR, I, Pf. xii).  
This single thought serves as the title of his magnum opus, The World as Will and 
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Representation: the world is at once will and representation.  But this is not the only formulation 
of it.  Indeed, I would argue that Schopenhauer’s pessimism is captured by a slightly different 
declaration that comes at the end of Book IV of WWR: “the world is the self-knowledge of the 
will” (WWR, I, 410).  Here we find Schopenhauer combining the two titular revelations of the 
book into one, i.e., that the world is will that comes to know (or represent) itself.   By this 
Schopenhauer means that the will, the aimless undercurrent of all things in nature that constantly 
strives for greater realization and prolongation of itself, reaches its highest form in the human 
being; in this form, the will finally is able to reflect upon its own essence and existence and 
thereby come to know itself.  Of course, once the will, as human being, comes to truly know 
itself, it is forced to admit that its existence is futile, its suffering pointless, and its end a blessing.  
Hence the human being becomes the only willing creature that can resign her will-to-live—and, 
at least by Schopenhauer’s lights, she would be well within her rights to do so. 
Thus, when we take the parts of Schopenhauer’s philosophy individually, we may find 
that the singularity of this “single thought” is not as homogenous as he claims it to be.  
Specifically, Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetics in Book III of WWR does not expressly 
communicate the pessimism that we encounter elsewhere.  Indeed, Schopenhauer sees aesthetics 
as having “bright and fair contents” when compared to other aspects of his greater project, 
although he insists that the conclusion of his aesthetic theory “points once more in the same 
direction,” i.e., towards a pessimistic outlook on existence (WWR, II, 360).   But does his 
aesthetic philosophy actually support his pessimistic leanings?   
Readers of Schopenhauer seeking to gain a better understanding of his aesthetics often 
focus on his account of aesthetic contemplation in Book III of WWR.  This is, at least on the 
surface, the best place to start.  What is more, his discussion of aesthetic contemplation seems to 
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cohere with his pessimism, and specifically his discussion of ascetic insight in Book IV.  
According to Schopenhauer, aesthetic contemplation provides a reprieve from suffering that is 
similar to, albeit more fleeting than the total annihilation of willing that we witness in the ascetic.  
In other words, when experiencing aesthetic contemplation, one gets a small taste of what it must 
feel like to have relinquished the will altogether.  When lost in aesthetic contemplation, we are 
“delivered from the fierce pressure of the will,” and we “emerge, as it were, from the heavy 
atmosphere of the earth” (WWR, I, 390).  From this “most blissful” experience, Schopenhauer 
writes, “we can infer how blessed must be the life of a man whose will is silenced not for a few 
moments, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but for ever, indeed completely extinguished, 
except for the last glimmering spark that maintains the body and is extinguished with it” (WWR, 
I, 390).    
This connection between aesthetic contemplation and asceticism is important, but not one 
that give us the whole story.  In order to reach a better understanding of how Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetic philosophy relates to his larger philosophical project, I propose we instead look to the 
exceptional, and exceptionally rare, figure that stands center-stage in Schopenhauer’s aesthetic 
theory—that is, the aesthetic genius, who not only is epistemically gifted in that he has 
perceptive knowledge of the inner nature of worldly objects but, assuming he has the technical 
skill to do so, is also able to communicate this knowledge to the rest of us through his artistic 
works.   
Considering the aesthetic genius may assist us in gaining a greater understanding of how 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetics relates to his pessimism.  In this paper, I will argue that, upon closer 
examination, Schopenhauer’s aesthetic genius proves to be more at odds with his pessimism than 
he may first seem.   Indeed, I think that we find that Schopenhauer undermines his pessimistic 
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outlook on life once we recognize that, internal to his aesthetic philosophy, the aesthetic genius 
is someone who necessarily affirms the will-to-live; thus the aesthetic genius stands in 
diametrical opposition to Schopenhauer’s ascetic saint, who steadfastly denies the will-to-live.  
To show that this is the case, I will contend that the aesthetic genius’ desire to communicate his 
knowledge of the world entails an affirmation of the will-to-live; moreover, there are significant 
parallels between artistic creation and procreation that, when explored, strengthen the reading of 
the aesthetic genius as affirming the will-to-live.  These claims lead me to conclude that, whereas 
the ascetic saint denies the will-to-live as a result of her knowledge of the world, the artistic 
genius affirms the will-to-live by seeking to create something that immortalizes his knowledge of 
the nature of things.1  
After providing an overview of Schopenhauer’s epistemology of art and the aesthetic 
genius in Section 2, in Section 3 I will consider and reject some scholars’ assertions that 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetic genius is one who denies of the will-to-live; specifically, I demonstrate 
that aesthetics cannot involve denial because of its reliance on the world of representation, a 
world that ultimately founders for someone who successfully denies the will-to-live.  Then, in 
Section 4, I will explain why, when surveying the account of aesthetic genius given throughout 
Schopenhauer’s works, we should conclude that the aesthetic genius affirms the will-to-live 
given his need to create and his desire to communicate.  In Section 5, I will strengthen this claim 
by showing that there are strong parallels between the aesthetic genius’ need to create works of 
art and human beings’ more pervasive need to procreate.  These parallels elucidate the ways in 
which works of art act as “immortal children” of the aesthetic genius, and thus are, if not actual 
                                                 
1 In this paper, I will use masculine pronouns to refer to the aesthetic genius and feminine pronouns to 
refer to the ascetic saint.  This is a purely stylistic decision, meant to aid the reader in distinguishing 
between the two figures.  I do not believe that gender plays a part in one’s aesthetic or ascetic 
understanding of the world. 
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instantiations of the affirmation of the will-to-live, the fruits of one who affirms life.  I will end 
by addressing the deviancy of this conclusion from the rest of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and 
arguing that we find seeds of an affirmative philosophy in Schopenhauer’s aesthetics, seeds 
which Nietzsche goes on to cultivate. 
2 AESTHETIC CONTEMPLATION AND THE AESTHETIC GENIUS 
2.1 The Pure Knowing of Aesthetic Contemplation  
 
For Schopenhauer, aesthetics is an exceptional kind of epistemic enterprise that grants us 
a more intimate understanding of the many objects we encounter in the world.  Thus 
Schopenhauer’s discussion of aesthetics, as seen in the first volume of The World as Will and 
Representation, is precipitated by some important epistemological observations borne of his 
larger metaphysical system.  Specifically, Schopenhauer distinguishes between knowledge 
commonly so-called and what he calls “pure knowledge.”  We are, broadly speaking, a species of 
individual knowers, which means that we rarely seek, find, or use knowledge that does not 
somehow serve our individual wills, i.e., our specific wants and needs.  This is because 
knowledge is originally a product of the will, brought into being to help the will in its pursuit to 
further realize itself; consequently, knowledge is indentured to the will and guided by the will’s 
directives.  As Schopenhauer writes, “as a rule, knowledge remains subordinate to the service of 
the will, as indeed it came into being for this service; in fact, it sprang from the will, so to speak, 
as the head from the trunk” (WWR, I, 177).  In our everyday lives, we accumulate knowledge 
that allows us to make sense of how each of us stands in relation to other objects.  We come to 
know the world around us insofar as we know what we can and cannot do in it and with it,  
learning how best to navigate it such that we survive and thrive. All the knowledge in the world, 
however, does not change the fact that we are, through and through, instantiations of will, i.e., 
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the interminable desire for realization that drives all of life and that can never be satisfied.  As 
such, we exist always in a state of deficiency and want, regardless of how much knowledge we 
accrue. We satisfy one desire only to have another rise to the fore, for all of life shares an 
“absence of any lasting final aim” (WWR, II, 354).  In this way, the human condition is one of 
incessant lacking and longing, of one desire always ready to succeed another.   
Yet, while Schopenhauer declares that it is the “sole endeavor of knowledge” to serve the 
will by making connections between ourselves and other objects so that we might better bear the 
weight of our mortal coils, he also believes that it is possible, although rare, for knowledge to 
momentarily break free from the tyranny of the will.  In these rare moments, we no longer know 
objects as individual (willing) subjects, but as pure subjects, unburdened by the unrelenting 
demands of the will.  It follows from this that, in such exceptional instances, instead of 
perceiving objects only insofar as they relate to us, we perceive them as pure objects—that is, we 
perceive objects as they are in themselves, entirely independent of us and of the surrounding 
world.  
Raised up by the power of the mind, we relinquish the ordinary way of 
considering things, and cease to follow under the guidance of the forms of the 
principle of sufficient reason merely their relations to one another, whose final 
goal is always the relation to our own will.  Thus we no longer consider the 
where, the when, the why, and the whither in things, but simply and solely the 
what. (WWR, I, 178) 
 
This what Schopenhauer calls the Idea, drawing on the Platonic conception of an archetypal 
being “which is dependent on nothing, but which is in and by itself” (WWR, I, 172).  When 
contemplating the Idea of an object, we perceive it as it is in-itself; we witness its eternal form, 
divorced from time, space, causality—that is, from the ways in which the object relates to 
ourselves and to other objects in nature.  In so doing, we effectively become one with the object, 
Page 7 
 
existing in such moments of contemplation for the Idea alone.2  This access to pure knowledge, 
to the Idea, is what Schopenhauer calls aesthetic contemplation. 
All aesthetics, according to Schopenhauer, is aimed solely at the communication of the 
Ideas (WWR, I, 185).  Given this, what we call beautiful in aesthetics is what is true to the form 
of the object—that is to say, what is true to the Idea that an object represents.  When an Idea is 
successfully communicated, we experience aesthetic pleasure.  This is because during aesthetic 
contemplation, we are “delivered from the miserable self” in order to become “entirely one with 
those objects, and foreign as our want is to them, it is at such moments just as foreign to us” 
(WWR, I, 199).  As pure subjects, we can engage with an aesthetic object such that “the world as 
representation alone remains [while] the world as will has disappeared” (WWR, I, 199).  Left 
alone with the world as representation, we experience a “quieting” of our individual wills and of 
all the trouble and turmoil that accompanies it.  We are released from the will’s hold over us, and 
its inherently tumultuous nature is temporarily silenced.  Thus, while there is no real escape from 
the chronic nature of human suffering (since the human condition, and indeed all of nature, is 
chronic suffering),3 Schopenhauer believes that, when the will is quieted, we are granted a 
temporary reprieve from this condition, attaining momentary relief from the otherwise constant 
demands of life.  The Ideas, when perceived, quell and quiet the will, and we are freed 
momentarily both from the will itself and from the common knowledge that serves the will.  We 
are all Sisyphus, laboring inexorably under the weight of the will that we were made to carry.  
                                                 
2 In Schopenhauer’s words: “When the Idea appears, subject and object can no longer be distinguished in 
it, because the Idea, the adequate objectivity of the will, the real world as representation, arises only when 
subject and object reciprocally fill and penetrate each other completely” (WWR, I,  180). 
3 The exception to this rule is the ascetic saint, whose insight into the inner nature of the world causes her 
will (and the suffering that defines it) to be extinguished altogether.  See Section 3.1 for further 
discussion.  
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Yet the pure knowing of aesthetic contemplation suspends this state of being, granting us a 
respite from the distress of the everyday, if only for a short time. 
  
2.2 The Aesthetic Genius 
 
Schopenhauer believes that the ability to perceive Ideas by means of aesthetic 
contemplation is common to all human beings.  That said, for most people, moments of aesthetic 
contemplation are few and far between.  However, the genius is privileged in that he is able to 
perceive Ideas in the world around him more easily and at greater length.  While “the common, 
ordinary man” is, for the most part, incapable of disinterestedly considering an object for a 
prolonged period of time before falling back into the grips of the will, the genius is able to 
maintain his gaze upon an object such that he becomes wholly engrossed in his perception of its 
Idea.  
Only through the pure contemplation…[when one] becomes absorbed entirely in 
the object, are the Ideas comprehended; and the nature of genius consists 
precisely in the preeminent ability for such contemplation.  Now as this demands 
a complete forgetting of our own person and of its relation and connexions, the 
gift of genius is nothing but the most complete objectivity, i.e., the objective 
tendency of the mind, as opposed to the subjective directed to our own person, 
i.e., to the will.  Accordingly, genius is the capacity to remain in a state of pure 
perception, to lose oneself in perception, to remove from the service of the will 
the knowledge which originally existed only for this service. (WWR, I, 185) 
 
The genius’ heightened intellectual abilities make it such that he can readily enter a state of pure 
knowing, perceiving both the Ideas of objects he encounters in the natural world as well as the 
Ideas of aesthetic objects themselves.  While most people “do not like to be alone with nature” 
since “their knowledge remains subject to the will,” the genius finds solace when alone with 
nature, for by himself he can contemplate natural beauty uninterrupted (WWR, I, 198).  And 
whereas most people will pass from painting to painting in an art museum, observing, with no 
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little distraction, the different objects depicted, only occasionally lingering a minute or two more 
before a work that catches their interest, the genius can sit for hours before a single still life, 
seemingly lost in his perception of the Idea depicted. The genius sets aside the demands of his 
individuated will “in order to remain pure knowing subject, the clear eye of the world” (WWR, I, 
186).  For the aesthetic genius,4 this ability comes with a desire—or, perhaps more appropriately, 
a need—not just to contemplate but also to create works of art.  
While natural beauty has the power to induce aesthetic contemplation, works of art are 
the primary means by which we experience aesthetic contemplation.  This is because art is, 
simply put, “the work of genius” (WWR, I, 184), and therefore has the added benefit of being an 
object created and informed by the aesthetic genius’ heightened perception.  Because nature is 
everywhere scarred by the workings of the will, most of us cannot behold an object in nature and 
see its Idea.  The aesthetic genius, however, is able to do precisely this; with the help of his 
imagination, he knows how to remove reminders of the phenomenal experience of the will, thus 
ensuring that his viewer can contemplate his work without being reminded of the various 
demands of the will.  A still-life painter, as he studies the object he intends to represent, may add 
a missing petal of a flower or omit a gnarled bruise on an apple, for such blemishes and 
imperfections would remind his viewer of how flowers wilt and how fruits decay and become 
inedible.  Were these flaws included in a work of art, the spectator attending to such details 
would experience an obstacle to her aesthetic contemplation; she would recall how flowers 
wither shortly after blooming, how fruits rot shortly after ripening, thus passing in and out of 
                                                 
4 While Schopenhauer’s discussions of genius often focus on the aesthetic genius, Schopenhauer makes 
multiple references to there being other types of genius as well.  Some philosophers, for instance, might 
be geniuses in their own right (WWR, II, 376).  And even saints, according to Schopenhauer, can be said 
to possess a certain kind of genius: “in an ethical respect [the saint] becomes inspired with genius” (WWR, 
I, 396).  The primary focus here will be on the aesthetic genius, since, as I will show, this type of genius 
most clearly affirms the will-to-live through artistic creation.   
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phenomenal existence, just as all individuals instances of the will must.  Such reminders of the 
wounds suffered by the objects depicted would throw the spectator back into the world as will, 
and her will would resume its predominance over knowledge.  In order to represent an Idea of an 
object, then, the aesthetic genius must aim to depict the pure form of said object, unadulterated 
by the influences and inflictions of other forms of the will.  As Schopenhauer writes, “objectivity 
should be pure, complete, adequate objectivity of the will” (WWR, I, 180).  The aesthetic genius 
intuitively recognizes the importance of this purity; he employs his imagination when observing 
an object and “see[s] in things not what nature has actually formed, but what she endeavored to 
form, yet did not bring about, because of the conflict of her forms with one another” (WWR, I, 
186).   The aesthetic genius, then, grasps what nature only gestures at, and holds on to it long 
enough to communicate it artistically. 
Importantly, Schopenhauer believes that only the aesthetic genius is capable of 
communicating the Ideas to the rest of us.  The genius has the acute ability to behold for a longer 
period of time the Idea of an object that presents itself in the phenomenal realm, which enables 
him “to retain that thoughtful contemplation necessary for him to repeat what is thus known in a 
voluntary and intentional work, such repetition being a work of art” (WWR, I, 195).  The genius 
as artist “lets us peer into the world through his eyes” by creating works of art that translate 
phenomenal objects into Ideas (WWR, I, 195).  The aesthetic genius has both the power to purely 
perceive an Idea and the raw talent—which becomes refined by technique—to aesthetically 
communicate it.5  An integral part of the aesthetic genius that distinguishes him from others is 
that these powers compel him to make use of them.  We will return to this point in Section 4. 
                                                 
5 Wittgenstein later expresses this point nicely when he writes that there is “no more light in a genius than 
in any other honest man—but he has a particular kind of lens to concentrate this light into a burning 
point” (CV 35e).   
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3 AESTHETIC GENIUS AS DENIAL 
Schopenhauer’s characterization of aesthetic contemplation and the aesthetic genius has 
led some to conclude that aesthetic experience, for Schopenhauer, involves a denial of the will.  
Specifically, some have argued that the creative process, i.e., the experience of the aesthetic 
genius, is a process that requires the denial of the will.  Dennis Vanden Auweele, for instance, 
argues that the aesthetic genius must deny the will in order to create a work of art.  To this end 
Vanden Auweele writes that “the genius makes an ‘abnormal use of the intellect’ by not enlisting 
the intellect in the affirmation of the will, but in its denial” (Vanden Auweele 155).  In a similar 
vein, Lucian Krukowski argues that the artist’s experience is divided between “antithetical 
worlds,” for while “art is created in the world of action, the world of will,” art’s imperative is to 
“deny that world’s adequacy for the human psyche”; thus the creative process is “a self-denial, 
for the artist knows the reasons—they are there in the work—that speak against continuing to 
[will]” (Krukowski 71, 67).  This interpretation of Schopenhauer is certainly nothing new.  
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s most notable intellectual inheritor, also read Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetics as demanding that the will be denied.  Hence Nietzsche claims that Schopenhauer 
“interpreted art, heroism, genius, beauty, great sympathy, knowledge, the will to truth, and 
tragedy, in turn, as consequences of ‘negation’ or of the ‘will’s’ need to negate” (TI, 
“Skirmishes,” 21).   
The merits of this reading of Schopenhauer are clear, for by characterizing aesthetic 
contemplation and creation as denial of the will, we are able more easily to connect 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetics to his pessimism, and specifically, his asceticism.  This connection, 
moreover, seems coherent; for whereas the aesthetic contemplator’s will is quieted and silenced, 
temporarily disappearing such that he becomes pure subject, the ascetic is one who wholly 
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denies the will such that her will is totally annihilated.  The difference between aesthetic 
contemplation and asceticism thus appears to be one of degree, where both experiences have the 
same end of escaping or negating the world as will.  But whereas someone engaged in aesthetic 
contemplation achieves this end only for a brief period of time before being thrown back into the 
world as will, the successful ascetic wholly detaches herself from the willing world.  If we accept 
this reading, then Nietzsche would be right in saying that Schopenhauer “sees in [beauty] a 
bridge on which one will go farther, or develop a thirst to go farther.  Beauty is for 
[Schopenhauer] a momentary redemption from the ‘will’—a lure to eternal redemption” (TI, 
“Skirmishes,” 22).  Art would be, in essence, a stepping stone to salvation—that is, to true and 
absolute emancipation from the will. 
But just because this reading allows us to easily connect Schopenhauer’s aesthetic and 
ethical theories does not necessarily mean we should accept it; and just because the aesthetic 
genius is delivered from the will for a time during aesthetic contemplation does not necessarily 
mean that he “negates” or “denies” the will.  To understand why we cannot draw these 
conclusions, we must turn our attention to the other pivotal figure of Schopenhauer’s philosophy: 
the ascetic saint. 
3.1 The Ascetic Saint 
The life of a human being is fraught with failed attempts to avoid its only certainty: 
death. Human existence is “a continual rushing of the present into the dead past, a constant 
dying” (WWR, I, 311).  That we know our deaths to be inevitable does not stop us from seeking 
to preserve and extend our lives for as long as possible.  In this regard, we act in accordance 
with, and indeed as the highest form of the will, which, as discussed above, makes our existence 
one of inexorable suffering and great hardship:  
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All willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from suffering.  
Fulfilment brings this to an end; yet for one wish that is fulfilled there remain at 
least ten that are denied.  Further, desiring lasts a long time, demands and requests 
go on to infinity; fulfilment is short and meted out sparingly…. No attained object 
of willing can give a satisfaction that lasts and no longer declines; but it is always 
like the alms thrown to a beggar, which reprieves him today so that his misery 
may be prolonged till tomorrow. (WWR, I, 196)   
 
With death always looming in front of us, we nonetheless hopelessly will our lives to continue— 
we by necessity6 continue to will in vain, even with the knowledge of our finitude in hand.  This 
compulsion to will, despite the futility of all willing, is the bedrock of the human condition.  We 
exist as the “objectified will-to-live,” bowing low to the rule of nature, even though nature is 
always ready to “let the individual fall” and expose her “to destruction in a thousand ways from 
the most insignificant accidents” (WWR, I, 276).  Such is the case for all things in nature, 
regardless of the forms they take.  The insults and injuries suffered by humanity—the breaking 
of bones, the breaking of hearts—are the same as, and thus ultimately of no more significance 
than, the petal plucked from the flower or the unsightly bruise on the apple.  The only difference 
between us and lower objectifications of the will is that we are able to reflect on the nature of our 
striving and recognize the inanity of our sorrows; and this ability, Schopenhauer believes, makes 
our plight all the more painful. 
But given the human being’s capacity to come to know the world as will, it is possible for 
her to gain a deeper insight into the unrelenting suffering that plagues all fragile and fleeting 
manifestations of the will.  An individual with such insight understands all too well that suffering 
is the essence of all of nature; she gains “complete knowledge of [her] own inner being”—that is, 
she comes to comprehend the will’s “inner nature, and [to find] it involved in a constant passing 
                                                 
6 While Schopenhauer believes this necessity to hold for all willing beings, he also insists that the saint, 
having ascetic insight into the true nature of things, is someone who wrests free of the necessity of the 
will.  This leads Schopenhauer to conclude that the saint is a “real contradiction” (WWR, I, 404).  This 
claim is further discussed in Section 4.   
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away, a vain striving, an inward conflict, and a continual suffering” (WWR, I, 383, 379).  Like 
the aesthetic genius, this individual enters a state of pure knowing; in her case, however, her 
knowledge is not of mere objectifications of the will, but of the truth of all willing.  And this 
truth amounts to—nothing.  Nothing that the will does, no form that the will takes, holds any real 
significance, any lasting value.  And there is nothing that justifies the suffering that every willing 
being endures as a consequence of its mere existence.  All of nature is the will embodied, but the 
will’s embodiment accomplishes nothing save the transitory individuation of hopeless and 
directionless striving, striving which has neither aim nor end.  After comprehending the true 
nature of all existence—and, furthermore, recognizing the unfortunate lot of human beings to 
experience pain and suffering to the highest degree—this individual, according to Schopenhauer, 
has no choice but to confirm “the reprehensibility of the world” and acknowledge that the 
negation or denial of the will is “the way to redemption from it” (PP, II, 283).  Consequently, she 
will thenceforth forego making a distinction between herself and the rest of the world.  Instead of 
attempting to merely alleviate her personal suffering or to momentarily quiet the will-to-live 
through aesthetic contemplation, she will become entirely detached from the cycle of suffering 
(WWR, I, 378).  Rather than strive to prolong her individual life (and her individual will), she 
will begin to deny the will-to-live, to renounce the struggle that defines her, the struggle of the 
will, and become an ascetic.  In this denial, she “attains to the state of voluntary renunciation, 
resignation, true composure, and complete willessness” (WWR, I, 379).  The abnegation of the 
will—the recantation of the suffering that accompanies all desires in life—becomes her life’s 
activity.7  Schopenhauer likens such a person to a saint, a “great soul” who attains true freedom 
                                                 
7 It is somewhat of a misnomer to call this total negation of willing a “life’s activity,” since all activity, 
for Schopenhauer, is driven by motives, and all motives are the workings of the will.  However, our 
ability to characterize the “life” of the ascetic should be forgiven for its insufficiency. Language 
continually tempts error whenever we take up the topic of asceticism, since language is the “effect” of 
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from the mandates of the will by ascetically effacing her individual connection to the 
phenomenal world (WWR, I, 383). 
When comparing the personages of the aesthetic genius and the ascetic saint, we find a 
number of similarities that support the argument that the aesthetic genius, like the saint, is also 
someone who denies the will.  Both experience some kind of cessation of individual, 
phenomenal willing, and both are epistemically gifted, having privileged access to knowledge 
that has broken free from the confines of the world as will, knowledge that can be grasped only 
when one is able to see through the principle of sufficient reason and into the inner nature of 
things.  What is more, the heightened epistemic abilities of the aesthetic genius seem similar to 
the saint’s in that both are more or less bestowed upon them as opposed to being cultivated by 
them.  As Schopenhauer argues, a person’s genius “is not in [his] power at all,” but rather is the 
consequence of an inborn excess of intellect (PP, II, 77).  The saint’s insight, in turn, “is not to 
be forcibly arrived at by intention or design,” but “comes suddenly, as if flying in from without” 
(WWR, I, 404).  This leads Vanden Auweele to conclude that the genius’ exceptional intellectual 
abilities are “similar to gifts of grace in the sense that the genius is ‘blessed’ with these in a way 
that the commoner is not” (Auweele 150).   
In light of such similarities, it seems possible (and, one might argue, probable) that the 
aesthetic genius and the ascetic saint would be similar persons, similarly situated epistemically; 
                                                                                                                                                             
conceptual consciousness, or of what Schopenhauer calls “reason speaking to reason,” and the saint’s 
experience can be neither captured nor comprehended by reason (WWR, I, 39-40).  As Schopenhauer goes 
on to say: “language, like every other phenomenon that we ascribe to reason, and like everything that 
distinguishes man from the animal, is to be explained by this one simple thing as its source, namely 
concepts, representations that are abstract and not perceptive” (WWR, I, 40).  As we shall see, we are 
wholly incapable of adequately capturing the ascetic’s experience, for the ascetic is not only removed 
from the world as will, but also from the world as representation. 
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one could even venture to suggest that they could be the same person in some instances.8  As 
Schopenhauer notes, we only come to understand the exceptional aspects of the two figures 
through experience, and the genius and the saint both stand noticeably apart from the rest of 
humanity in appearance and in deed (WWR, I, 188, 383).  Schopenhauer also says that both the 
saint and the genius are easily mistaken as victims of madness.  The genius, who “uses his 
intellect contrary to its destiny,” that is, “for comprehending the objective nature of things,” is 
disconnected from, and therefore largely unconcerned with, everyday willing; indeed, 
Schopenhauer goes so far as to say that the genius’ excess of intellect “often leaves the will very 
inopportunely in the lurch; and accordingly, the individual so gifted becomes more or less 
useless for life; in fact, by his conduct we are sometimes reminded of madness” (WWR, II, 388-
389). The will of the saint is equally if not more forsaken by her ascetic insight, for she has 
learned the tragic truth of all existence—i.e., that “nothing else can be stated as the aim of our 
existence except the knowledge that it would be better for us not to exist” (WWR, II, 605).  
Lacking the motivation to continue living, her will having totally withdrawn itself from her 
being, the saint no longer interacts with the world as a willing individual.  This results in a 
disposition wholly at odds with the world of willing that enthralls the rest of humanity.   
Given these similarities, it may seem as though the aesthetic genius and the saint are cut 
from the same cloth.  But, despite their commonalities, an important question still lingers: why 
does the aesthetic genius create, while the saint does not?  Or, to put it another way: if it is case 
that the aesthetic genius and the saint both have a deeper insight into the nature of the world, 
why do they respond to this knowledge in different ways? For while we find the saint completely 
                                                 
8 Indeed, Schopenhauer suggests this very possibility when he writes, at the end of Book III of WWR, that 
the genius may finally “become tired of the spectacle” of life and “[seize] upon the serious side of 
things,” i.e. ascetic insights (WWR, I, 267).  However, this suggestion does not preclude the possibility 
that the aesthetic genius who does not become tired of life’s spectacle is in fact affirming the will-to-live 
through artistic creation. 
Page 17 
 
withdrawing from the world she inhabits, we find aesthetic genius still engaging with the 
surrounding world, at least to some extent, when he takes up the brush.   
 
3.2 The Impossibility of Representing of Ascetic Insights 
Considering this question, Julian Young suggests a way to combine Schopenhauer’s 
accounts in Books III and IV of WWR such that the two domains, aestheticism and asceticism, 
facilitate one another.  Given what at first seem to be very similar accounts of aesthetic genius 
and ascetic sainthood, Young admits that we may be inclined to think that “the object of ascetic 
vision ought to be the same as the object of the (serendipitously same-sounding in both English 
and German) aesthetic vision” (Young 204). But upon closer inspection, this suggestion does not 
seem viable; for whereas “the object of aesthetic vision is the whatness of the phenomenal world, 
the ascetic sees through the ‘veil of Maya’ to an ecstatic vision of transcendent holiness. So,” 
asks Young, “why on earth should the two will-free mirrors reﬂect such different things?” 
(Young 204).   
Schopenhauer does not provide an answer to this question, although the most obvious 
answer threatens to reveal an inconsistency between Schopenhauer’s accounts of pure knowing 
in his discussions of the aesthetic genius and the ascetic saint.  Attempting to address this 
problem, Young argues that “the two accounts of the state of pure-mirroring are not actually 
incompatible with each other, [and] they can in fact be combined in an unexpected and 
fascinating way” (Young 204).  As an example of this combination, Young considers Cezanne’s 
studies of Mont Sainte-Victoire: 
The brushstrokes allow the mountain to become partially translucent so that one 
sees through the object to the inﬁnite blue depths beyond. In Schopenhauerian 
terms, the ‘veil of Maya’ becomes transparent allowing one to see through to the 
holiness of the (non-‘empty’) ‘nothing’ beyond. (Young 204) 
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A work of art, according to Young, has the power to represent nothingness—that is to say, a 
representation can express the absence of all representation. Yet this example, I would argue, is 
fundamentally flawed, as it implies that it is possible to represent ascetic insights.  To suggest 
that Cezanne’s brushstrokes somehow allow one to see through the “the veil of Maya” and 
witness the “nothing” beyond is to suggest that the saint’s insight into the nature of the world—
i.e., its nothingness—can be communicated through a pictorial work of art.  This claim seems not 
only implausible, but also contradictory to Schopenhauer’s characterization of the Ideas, which 
the aesthetic genius works to represent.  More specifically, Young’s suggestion runs counter to 
Schopenhauer’s discussion of the relationship between the will as thing-in-itself and the Ideas.  
As Schopenhauer writes, “Idea and thing-in-itself are not for us absolutely one and the same.  On 
the contrary, for us the Idea is only the immediate, and therefore adequate, objectivity of the 
thing-in-itself, which itself, however, is the will” (WWR, I, 174, emphasis mine).  The Idea is “the 
most adequate objectivity possible of the will or of the thing-in-itself”—“most adequate” 
because the Idea is a “definite and fixed grade of the will’s objectification” (WWR, I, 175; 130).  
While Schopenhauer believes the will is the thing-in-itself and thus the essence of all existence, 
he also insists that the will has many grades of objectification.  This explains the existence of 
multiple Ideas, the different grades of objectification of the will, which range from the lowest 
grade (i.e., inorganic substances such as earth, water, wind, etc.) to the highest grade (i.e., the 
human being).   
An Idea is objective insofar as it captures what is essential to an object at that particular 
grade; it is an object divested of its particular phenomenal characteristics such that only the idea 
of it remains—that is, its most objective and pure form, or the “persistent form of the whole 
species” (WWR, I, 195).  Schopenhauer describes the nature of the Idea in the following way:   
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When clouds move, the figures they form are not essential, but indifferent to 
them.  But that as elastic vapour they are pressed together, driven off, spread out, 
and torn apart by the force of the wind, this is their nature, this is the essence of 
the forces that are objectified in them, this is the Idea. (WWR, I, 182) 
 
It is because Ideas are the most adequate objectifications of the will that they can be represented 
at all, and thus can be represented in artistic works.  This means that in aesthetic contemplation, 
there is still something there—specifically, the representation of the adequate objectification of 
the will, or what Schopenhauer calls “representation in general.”  Just because the object is 
represented in its purest form does not mean that it is the same as the nothing that defines the 
insight of the saint.  The will as thing-in-itself as the saint knows it, as a nothingness, cannot be 
represented because the world as will presupposes the will’s objectification, its representation, 
and therefore “is something entirely different from the representation” (WWR, I, 128). The 
aesthetic genius’ knowledge of the world is still objective and thus, to some extent, still related to 
the world as representation.  The saint, in contrast, no longer engages with the world as will or 
the world as representation.  Once she comes to understand that everything, herself included, is 
merely hopeless, meaningless striving, she begins to perceive, and indeed becomes, the only 
alternative to the world as will and representation: nothingness.  
The impossibility of representing the ascetic’s insight—and the fact that objectification is 
a crucial part of the genius’ ability to represent the Ideas—points us to the main issue with 
Young’s claim.   Young asks whether the object of aesthetic vision is or can be the same as the 
object of ascetic’s vision, but when the ascetic perceives the inner nature of the world, she does 
not behold an object at all.  The veil of Maya is fully lifted for her; all representation falls away 
as she comes to know the true essence of existence.  Hence Schopenhauer writes of ascetics that 
“to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this very real world of ours with all its 
suns and galaxies, is—nothing” (WWR, I, 412).  To further understand what this means, it is 
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helpful to look at another instance of the denial of the will that occurs in those human beings 
who resign themselves to nonexistence in their last moments of life.  The hour before death is 
crucial, for it is during this time that one is given a final chance to affirm or deny the will: but 
whereas one who affirms the will in his hour of death “falls back into the womb of nature,” one 
who (in Schopenhauer’s opinion, rightly) denies it   
no longer belongs to [nature], but—: we lack image, concept, and word for this 
opposite, just because all these are taken from the objectification of the will, and 
therefore belong to that objectification; consequently, they cannot in any way 
express its absolute opposite; accordingly, this remains for us a mere negation. 
(WWR, II, 609, emphasis mine).   
 
Like the dying person, the saint experiences the “absolute opposite” of objectification; in 
perceiving nothingness, she experiences the negation of the “whole nature” of the world, which 
is “through and through will, and at the same time through and through representation” (WWR, I, 
162).  Thus we find that one who denies the will-to-live must deny not only the will, but 
representation as well.  Wittgenstein’s final words of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus nod to this 
truth: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (§7).   
4 AESTHETIC GENIUS AS AFFIRMATION  
That ascetic insights cannot be expressed aesthetically reveals an important element of 
the relationship between aesthetics and asceticism, which is that the ascetic, qua ascetic, is cut 
off from the world of representation, the world that defines aesthetics.   
What does this tell us, then, about how the aesthetic genius and the ascetic saint differ? 
At this point in our discussion, we see that the aesthetic genius is someone who engages the 
world of representation while the saint does not (or, perhaps more appropriately, cannot).  This is 
no small point to make.  In this, we see that the reactions of the two knowers are not just 
different, but greatly at odds with one another.  While the saint retreats from the world she 
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perceives, the aesthetic genius repeats the world he perceives.  Schopenhauer characterizes both 
persons as “clear mirrors of the world,” but what they reflect are absolute opposite aspects of the 
world.  The artist reflects the pure objectivity of the world in his aesthetic vision, i.e. perfected 
instantiations of will, which can be represented.  The saint, in contrast, reflects the emptiness of 
the world, the inanity of the objects in it, and the fact that there is nothing that justifies, or even 
makes sense of, life’s many trials and tribulations.  We see this clearly when Schopenhauer 
writes that “[d]enial, abolition, turning in of the will are also abolition and disappearance of the 
world, of its mirror.  If we no longer perceive the will in this mirror…we complain that it is lost 
in nothingness” (WWR, 1, 410, emphasis mine).  This explains why the saint is the perfected 
incarnation of the denial of the will.  Beholding nothing, she can represent nothing, reflect 
nothing; the world as will begins to fall away, and with it the world as representation, so that she 
perceives nothing; and thus she finds nothing to motivate her to prolong her existence.  Having 
no connection to the world, she can only passively withdraw from it.   
This gets us closer to understanding why the aesthetic genius and the ascetic saint differ 
as much as they do—why these two figures react so differently to their insights into the true 
nature of things.  While the saint’s will turns away from the world after she perceives its true 
nature,9 the will of the aesthetic genius takes up a certain artistic medium—a material means of 
representing—in order to communicate the knowledge he has perceived.  As a pure 
representation, his artwork serves as an ideal reflection10 of his experience of pure knowing, an 
                                                 
9 To be sure, there is no, nor can there be, any intentionality behind the saint’s turning away from the 
world, for “denial of willing, that entrance into freedom, is not to be forcibly arrived at by intention or 
design,” but “comes suddenly, as if flying in from without” (WWR, I, 404).  This event Schopenhauer 
calls “the effect of grace,” and should not be confused with the “spiritual peace” experienced by the artist 
during aesthetic contemplation (WWR, I, 197).  The spiritual peace, experienced by the artist, is merely 
the resting of the will; the effect of grace, on the other hand, is the will’s total abolition.   
10 It is because human beings have reflection as a faculty of representation that they are able to engage in 
aesthetic contemplation.  In them we see that “an entirely new consciousness has arisen, which with very 
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experience that necessarily involves perceiving one or more of the adequate objectifications of 
the will (the Ideas).   
Given the aesthetic genius’ engagement with the world of representation, it does not 
appear as if he is someone who, like the ascetic saint, denies the will-to-live.  In fact, that the 
aesthetic genius is engaged with the world at all seems to entail that he does not deny it.  Art is, 
simply put, “the work of genius” (WWR, I, 184, emphasis mine).  Works of art communicate 
knowledge by “repeat[ing] the eternal ideas apprehended through pure contemplation, the 
essential and abiding element in all the phenomena of the world” (WWR, 1, 184).  The aesthetic 
genius, then, is one who strives to repeat the Ideas by means of representation, who creates a 
work of art that communicates his knowledge of things to the beholder.  In a work of art, a true 
artist “set[s] up a lasting monument of [his] objectivity and spiritual peace” (WWR, I, 197).  In 
order to create this lasting monument of objectivity of the will, the aesthetic genius must will his 
artwork into the world of representation.  He is motivated to express the knowledge he perceives, 
to represent the true content that underlies the objects of the world.  In so doing, he implicitly 
affirms the world he has perceived; he believes it to be worth communicating, and furthermore 
worth suffering for.  As Schopenhauer describes it: 
He is captivated by a consideration of the spectacle of the will’s objectification.  
He sticks to this, and does not get tired of contemplating it, and of repeating it in 
his descriptions…in other words, he himself is the will objectifying itself and 
remaining in constant suffering.  (WWR, I, 267, emphasis mine) 
 
In light of this, it should come as no surprise that geniuses suffer more than others.  As Dale 
Jacquette explains, “To live is to will, and hence to suffer, and no one more so for Schopenhauer 
than the aesthetic genius…because genius experiences the greatest frustrations of creative 
                                                                                                                                                             
appropriate and significant accuracy is called reflection.  For it is in fact a reflected appearance, a thing 
derived from this knowledge of perception” (WWR, I, 36).  The power of reflection is what distinguishes 
us from the animal: “The animal feels and perceives; man, in addition, thinks and knows” (WWR, I, 37).  
From this follows the artist’s ability to access knowledge of the will outside phenomena.   
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activity in its compulsion to represent” (Jacquette 10).   The suffering of the aesthetic genius is 
vastly different from the experience of the ascetic saint, who arguably does not suffer at all.  In 
her denial of the will-to-live, the ascetic saint loses all motivation—her individual will is not 
merely quieted, but disappears altogether.  Having been freed by the “flying in” of divine grace, 
she exemplifies what Schopenhauer calls the “self-suppression of the will” (WWR, I, 404).  This 
claim, to be sure, is somewhat problematic, and Schopenhauer acknowledges as much.  The idea 
that the will can suppress itself contradicts his assertion that “the will’s determinations through 
motives of character” are a matter of necessity (WWR, I, 403).  That said, Schopenhauer thinks 
the saint’s case is an exceptional one, one which requires that we tolerate contradiction in its 
expression in order to be even remotely understood.  This is because the saint is an instance of 
“real contradiction” in the world “that arises from the direct encroachment of the freedom of the 
will-in-itself, knowing no necessity, on the necessity of its phenomenon” (WWR, I, 404).  Human 
beings necessarily will, but in the case of the saint her will is eliminated.  And since the truth of 
the world is that it is will, and that all things in it act as and according to will, the saint, as a not-
willing individual, embodies something other than truth, or at least truth as we know it.  The 
saint, as an embodied negation of will, amounts to a walking contradiction.  The will is, as thing-
in-itself, the will-to-live, the constant struggle for phenomenal existence that we see in all of 
nature.  One who wholly denies the will-to-live goes against nature, against philosophy, against 
everything by willing nothing. 11 
                                                 
11 It is worth emphasizing that Schopenhauer, in his multiple attempts to characterize the metaphysical 
idea of the denial of willing, always insists that sainthood is possible while also conceding that we cannot 
understand how such a person exists.  It is “a priori,” he writes, “that that which now produces the 
phenomenon of the world must also be capable of not doing this…or, in other words, that there must also 
be a systole to the present diastole” (PP, II, 281).  But this a priori truth can be taken no further: “Since 
we know this being, the will, as thing in itself merely in and through the act of willing¸ we are incapable 
of saying or grasping what else it is or does after it has given up this act; this is why negation for us, who 
are the appearance of the will, is a transition to nothingness” (PP, II, 281).  
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The aesthetic genius is arguably a contradiction as well, but one of a different kind.  In 
that he is motivated to create works of art, he remains attached to the world as will despite 
having perceived the true nature of this world—or rather, because he has perceived its true 
nature.  Given that creativity requires activity, it seems wrong to say that, in the case of the 
aesthetic genius, knowledge of the will wholly quiets the will; rather, pure knowledge stirs his 
will, arousing in him an instinct to use his intellect to create, to perfect a representation that is 
able to express the pure knowledge he has perceived.  This instinct is, to be sure, not one that is 
characteristic of all willing individuals; according to Schopenhauer, the aesthetic genius “uses 
his intellect contrary to its destiny” by creating works of art (WWR, II, 388).  Schopenhauer aptly 
describes the intensity of this phenomenon in the following passage:  
And again, when that entire, abnormally enhanced power of knowledge 
occasionally directs itself suddenly with all its energy to the affairs and miseries 
of the will, it will readily apprehend these too vividly, will view everything in too 
glaring colors, in too bright a light, and in a monstrously exaggerated form; and in 
this way the individual falls into mere extremes…. All great theoretical 
achievements, be they of what kind they may, are brought about by their author 
directing all the forces of his mind to one point.  (WWR, II, 388) 
 
The aesthetic genius is moved, just like the rest of us; but, unlike most of us, the genius is able to 
“direct all the forces of his mind” to a single, objective end.  His knowledge and his intellectual 
energy, together with his imaginative capacities, inspire and inform his need to communicate and 
thus to create.  Given that all the intellectual powers of the aesthetic genius compel him to find 
ways of communicating the Ideas, it seems unlikely that the genius, as creator, is engaged in 
denial of the will.  In fact, it seems that the genius is doing just the opposite: for even after he 
gains pure knowledge of the nature of the world, he still wants and works to objectify this pure 
knowledge, specifically by communicating this knowledge in the representational world.  In so 
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doing, he produces a “lasting monument” of his own perception, a monument to the eternal 
forms of the different grades of objectification of the will.   
Given Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic genius, then, it would be wrong to conclude 
that he denies the will-to-live through artistic creation.  We can further recognize this to be an ill-
informed interpretation if we continue to consider the different relationships that the ascetic saint 
and the aesthetic genius have with knowledge and willing.  Distinguishing between the forms of 
freedom entailed by aesthetic contemplation and sainthood, John Atwell notes that the saint’s 
denial of the will, in that it involves the elimination of both character and will, must also entail 
the elimination of knowledge itself.  The aesthetic genius and the aesthetic spectator, on the 
contrary, both enter “states” of knowing, states in which, it would seem, the will is still somehow 
present.  Although aesthetic contemplation and creation involve knowledge wresting itself free 
of the will, the “state of mind” that this freedom involves “seems to be precluded by 
Schopenhauer’s contention that the intellect (or knowledge) is originated by the will for the sole 
purpose of furthering the will’s aims and ends” (Atwell 83).  And, if we again consider “the 
single thought” that Schopenhauer drives at—i.e., that “the world is the self-knowledge of the 
will” (WWR, I, 410)—then we must conclude that “[a]s long as there is knowledge, there is will” 
(Atwell 88).  It therefore cannot be the case that the will is totally absent from aesthetic 
contemplation, as Schopenhauer claims.  Instead, Atwell argues, the freedom involved in 
aesthetic contemplation is “freedom from the individual will” (Atwell 90).  This kind of freedom 
can be contrasted to the resigned freedom experienced by the saint, that is to say “freedom from 
the will altogether” (Atwell 90).  Atwell draws an important distinction between knowledge’s 
relationship to aesthetic contemplator and ascetic saint to make this point: 
…from the standpoint of knowledge, the “state” of the aesthetic contemplator 
differs in kind, and not just in time, from the “state” of the saint: in the former, the 
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will knows the will; whereas in the latter, the will has vanished, along with all 
knowledge. (Atwell 91) 
 
Because knowledge is borne of the will, the saint’s denial of the will must likewise involve the 
denial or absence of knowledge.  Indeed, Schopenhauer acknowledges as much when 
characterizing the saint’s experience: “such a state cannot really be called knowledge, since it no 
longer has the form of subject and object” (WWR, I, 410).  Being devoid of representation, the 
saint’s experience must likewise be devoid of the subject and object distinction required by the 
world of representation.  Thus it follows that the saint’s experience is one “that cannot be further 
communicated,” since anything that can be communicated must be able to be represented (WWR, 
I, 410). 
In contrast, since both aesthetic contemplation and creation involve knowledge on an 
objective level, it would seem as if the will does not fully disappear in aesthetic creation and 
contemplation.  Because knowledge is still at work in aesthetic contemplation, and knowledge 
presupposes the will as its origin, it cannot be the case that we experience “the self-elimination 
of the will” when engaged in aesthetic contemplation (Atwell 90).  To be sure, Schopenhauer 
insists that we exist in a “will-less” state when engaged in aesthetic contemplation.  When we are 
“apprehending the objective, indigenous essence of things,” the will “must stay out of the game 
entirely” (PP, II, 377).  However, existing in a will-less state during aesthetic contemplation does 
not entail the negation or denial of the will.  Instead, our state of knowing can be more 
appropriately characterized as one in which we are disassociated from the will; the will is not 
suppressed, but rather is suspended such that we are able to cognize objects in a way that is 
“totally separate and independent of the will” (PP, II, 377).  The will, as it were, is set aside for a 
time, allowing knowledge to assume full reign over the spectator’s experience.  The intellect is 
preeminent in this experience, and in a way becomes “unfaithful to its origin, the will”; 
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Schopenhauer describes this as “an abusive activity” and “decidedly abnormal,” but does not 
equate it to the saint’s experience, in which the intellect “turn[s] against the will”—an act which 
ultimately results in the elimination of will and knowledge alike (PP, II, 378).     
But, unlike in aesthetic contemplation, in which the will is more or less upstaged, in 
artistic creation the will proves to be a necessary player.  While the aesthetic genius, during 
moments of contemplation, exists in a state of “pure cognition,” temporarily divorced from his 
will, during moments of creation the will must reenter the scene; it “must be active again,” since 
“the purpose” of aesthetic creation “is the communication and representation of what is thus 
cognized” (PP, II, 377).  So while Schopenhauer is often found characterizing aesthetic 
contemplation as a passive enterprise, we find that the aesthetic genius is someone who turns this 
contemplation into willful activity—specifically, the activity of artistic creation.   
Now, that the aesthetic genius does not deny the will does not necessarily mean that he 
affirms it.  Indeed, at no point in his discussion of the affirmation of the will-to-live does 
Schopenhauer mention the aesthetic genius. Yet when we look to Schopenhauer’s discussion of 
affirmation of the will-to-live we find that it is consonant with Schopenhauer’s discussion of the 
aesthetic genius.  Those who affirm the will-to-live, according to Schopenhauer, have gained 
“philosophical knowledge of the nature of the world” and use their “faculty of reason” to 
“overcome influences adverse to [this knowledge]” (WWR, I, 283). The aesthetic genius uses his 
intellectual faculties in a similar fashion.  By finding means to represent his aesthetic insights, 
the aesthetic genius wills that his knowledge be realized in the world. In the process of 
communicating an adequate objectification of the will (an Idea) in an artistic work, then, the 
aesthetic genius creates an object that affirms his knowledge of an object’s true form.  And by 
affirming his insight, he also affirms his own life, i.e., the life that has allowed him to glean this 
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knowledge.  So it seems that, like one who affirms the will-to-live, the aesthetic genius 
“desire[s], in spite of calm deliberation, that the course of his life as he had hitherto experienced 
it should be of endless duration or of constant recurrence” (WWR, I, 283-284, emphasis mine).    
For the aesthetic genius, this recurrence occurs in his work; he creates an aesthetic object that 
will outlast his own mortality while also serving as a remembrance of it.  In one who affirms the 
will-to-live, his will “affirms itself; this means that while in its objectivity, that is to say, in the 
world and in life, its own inner nature is completely and distinctly given to it as representation, 
this knowledge does not in any way impede its willing” (WWR, I, 285, emphasis mine).  In the 
case of the aesthetic genius, the intellect is “above the ratio demanded by the aims of the will” 
and therefore is able to “abuse” the will in the artistic process; so it is not only the case that his 
knowledge of the inner nature of things is unimpeded by the will, but his knowledge furthermore 
impels the will to work for it (PP, II, 378).  His aesthetic insights do not halt or hinder the 
creative process, but catalyze it and gives it urgency.  And his ultimate end—a work of art that 
expresses his insight—justifies the suffering he must endure in order to produce his work.  But 
his frustrations are far outweighed by the rewards he reaps.  Indeed, Schopenhauer believes that 
“[g]enius is its own reward; for the best that one is, one must necessarily be for oneself” (WWR, 
II, 386).12  The aesthetic genius’ satisfaction in life, and his ability to affirm his own existence, 
ultimately rests on the immense satisfaction he finds in his work.  And, as Schopenhauer writes, 
his satisfaction in his work does not stem from any fame or fortune he attains as a result of it; 
rather, his happiness depends only on the work itself—that is, on his ability to create something 
that facilitates a “constant recurrence” of his and others’ contemplation of an Idea: “Not in fame, 
                                                 
12 Schopenhauer supplements this thought with a helpful and elegant quote from Goethe: “‘Whoever is 
born with a talent, to a talent, finds his fairest existence therein’” (WWR, II, 386). 
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but in that by which it is attained, lies the value” for the genius, “and in the production of 
immortal children lies the pleasure” (WWR, II, 386, emphasis mine). 
5 AESTHETIC GENIUS AND PROCREATION 
As mentioned above,13 Schopenhauer’s discussion of the insights of the dying resonates 
with his discussion of the ascetic insights that prompt the saint to deny the will.  In contrast, the 
genius’ creative impulse, as Schopenhauer describes it, is strikingly similar to his description of 
the human beings’ impulse to procreate.  Indeed, it is not uncommon to find Schopenhauer using 
metaphors of progenitor and progeny when discussing the relationship the aesthetic genius has to 
his work.  Insofar as the procreative impulse is the ultimate (albeit blind) affirmation of the will-
to-live, we thus find another aspect of Schopenhauer’s philosophy that further supports the idea 
that the aesthetic genius is one who affirms the will-to-live; that is, we can see how the artist 
affirms the will-to-live by considering how the creative aspect of artistic endeavors is analogous 
to procreation.   
To understand the significance of this analogy, let us start by turning our attention to 
Schopenhauer’s discussion of love.  According to Schopenhauer, the most intense love between 
two people is “a desire that exceeds in intensity every other; hence it makes a person ready for 
any sacrifice, and, if its fulfilment remains for ever denied, can lead to madness or suicide” 
(WWR, II, 549).  But a person’s readiness to sacrifice everything for the sake of her beloved is, 
Schopenhauer believes, often overly romanticized. As Simon May notes, Schopenhauer’s 
account of love was radical for its time, for in it he shifted “the entire debate about the real goal 
of love’s desires from intimacy with one who embodies goodness, truth and beauty…to the 
search for a mate with an optimal biological psychological make-up” (May 181).   Love is not, 
                                                 
13 See 3.2. 
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for Schopenhauer, some sort of intellectual bond between two people; this characterization of 
love is but a common misconception.  The human idea of love is merely a sentimental 
semblance, a saccharine show of weal and woe which belies the real purpose of all unions 
between lovers: the preservation and continuation of the species.  In truth, love is not a matter of 
two persons communing due to some intimate, spiritual connection; rather, it is the byproduct of 
instinct—specifically, the strongest of the instincts of any willing creature, the instinct to 
continue the species. Thus Schopenhauer declares that “instinct, directed absolutely to what is to 
be produced, underlies all sexual love” as well as all the social customs and institutions that 
encourage it: “What is looked for in marriage is not intellectual entertainment but the procreation 
of children; it is an alliance of hearts, not of heads” (WWR, II, 542; 545).    
Schopenhauer calls this instinct to procreate “the genius of the species” (WWR, II, 550, 
emphasis mine).  This is because we witness the true nature of the will in the procreative process. 
The desire to procreate, the desire to bring forth into existence something that contains a part of 
oneself, is the “metaphysical desire of the will-in-itself” for realization; in this sense, then, the 
act of procreation is the clearest mirror of the world as will.  For the will, the thing-in-itself that 
underlies all existence, is endless striving, unrelenting desire, defined by an “absence of all aim, 
of all limits” (WWR, I, 164).  Nothing that the will accomplishes or attains can satisfy it.  Its 
essential nature is one of “[e]ternal becoming, endless flux,” and thus “[e]very attained end is at 
the same time the beginning of a new course, and so on ad infinitum” (WWR, I, 164).  What the 
will strives for, what it desires, has no object or end.  For what the will really longs for, what it 
ultimately wants, is to continue—that is, to be immortal.  In Schopenhauer’s words, “the will 
wills life absolutely and for all time” (WWR, II, 568, emphasis mine).  Procreation, then, and the 
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love that motivates it, is the best, and indeed the only means the will has to satisfy its desire for 
immortality. 
Why, then, does the man in love hang with complete abandon on the eyes of his 
chosen one, is ready to make every sacrifice for her?  Because it is his immortal 
part that longs for her; it is always the mortal part alone that longs for everything 
else.  That eager or even ardent longing…is therefore an immediate pledge of the 
indestructibility of the kernel of our true nature, and of its continued existence in 
the species. (WWR, II, 559, emphasis mine) 
 
As individual instantiations of the will-to-live, we play only a small and short-lived role on the 
world’s stage in prolonging the existence of our species.  However, in our experience of life, we 
instinctually possess the will’s desire for immortality, despite knowing mortality to be 
inescapable. We come closest to actualizing this desire for immortality in the act of procreation, 
for it is only in this act that we contribute to our species’ survival; thus the truth of our being, i.e., 
that we are manifestations of the will-to-live, has “as its kernel, as its greatest concentration…the 
act of generation” (PP, II, 284).  As May writes, “the Will itself, which we experience above all 
in our sexual desire, does not die.  The true source of our being is indestructible and immortal” 
(May 185).  The “genius” of the species, then, is the instinct that all human beings have to bring 
a new individual into phenomenal existence and, in so doing, secure for the species its immortal 
seat in the world.  This pursuit of immortality is, for Schopenhauer, the affirmation of the will-
to-live; to this end Schopenhauer writes that “the reciprocal longing glances of two lovers” that 
precipitates procreation is “the purest expression of the will-to-live in its affirmation” (WWR, II, 
569).   
Similarly, the genius works to create something that immortalizes his insight, i.e., 
something that faithfully depicts the Ideas he has perceived.  But whereas human beings, when 
acting on their procreative instinct, are destined to fail in their pursuit, being able to bear only 
mortal children, Schopenhauer believes that the genius is one who succeeds in securing some 
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degree of immortality in his artwork.  This is because he conceives his artistic ideas from the 
standpoint of eternity, that is, as a “pure will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge” 
(WWR, I, 179, emphasis mine).  The Idea he perceives in the object that inspires his work is itself 
immortal and unchanging: “A perceptive apprehension has always been the process of generation 
in which every genuine work of art, every immortal idea, received the spark of life” (WWR, II, 
378).   
The goal of achieving immortality is not the only way in which artistic creation mirrors 
procreation.  Both acts of creation also involve the generation of an Idea.  In the case of human 
procreation, the ushering in of a new individual is also the creation of a new Idea: “this new 
individual is a new (Platonic) Idea; and, just as all the Ideas strive to enter into the phenomenon 
with the greatest vehemence…so does this particular Idea of a human individuality strive with 
the greatest eagerness and vehemence for its realization in the phenomenon” (WWR, II, 536-
537).  In this way, the genius of the species shows itself to be similar to the aesthetic genius’ 
creation of works of art, both being forms of production: while human procreation is the 
production of a new Idea, artistic creation is the production of a new object that reveals or 
repeats the Idea the artist perceives the world.  Indeed, Schopenhauer goes so far as to claim that 
“the creations of the genuine genius…are equal in truth to real persons” (WWR, I, 193).  And just 
as parents give birth with the knowledge that their child will outlive them, the genius, says 
Schopenhauer, creates his work knowing it is very improbable that said work will be appreciated 
in his lifetime; given this, he “is urged to think more of posterity than of the contemporary world 
by which he would merely be led astray” (PP, II, 87).  In a way, his work is his posterity, “the 
real fruit of his existence” (PP, II, 87).  Thus the genius’ concern for his work looks much like 
the insect’s concern for its eggs: 
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His efforts are just as decidedly concentrated on the completion and security of 
his work as are those of the insect in its final form on the security of its eggs and 
the provision for the brood it will never live to see. (PP, II, 87)  
 
While the animal is ready to sacrifice life and limb to protect its offspring, the genius is ready to 
forsake all other aspects of his existence in order to see his work to completion. The work of 
genius is not influenced by the popularity, fame, or fortune that are normally thought to 
accompany (and thus motivate) great works of art.  In fact, Schopenhauer asserts, a genius shuns 
all of these rewards, knowing they would only divert and pervert his insight into the true nature 
of the world and distract him from his creative instinct, his desire to make something 
representative of his insight.  The genius can find his meaning and purpose only in “the 
production of immortal children,” in the creation of lasting representations that facilitate 
knowledge of the Ideas.  Thus, much as the species does in the sexual process, in the creative 
process, we find the genius seeking an immortality—but in the case of the genius, his is not an 
immortality for his species, but an immortality for himself. 
5.1 Blind vs. Intentional Affirmation 
The difference between the immortality sought in the act of procreation and that sought in 
artistic creation brings out an important distinction that Schopenhauer makes between the blind 
affirmation of the will-to-live of the procreator, which Schopenhauer has little respect for, and 
what seems to be the intentional, conscious affirmation of the will-to-live of the aesthetic genius, 
which Schopenhauer seems to hold in high regard.  As with human procreation, instinct plays an 
important role in artistic creation.  We often find Schopenhauer likening the artist’s desire to 
communicate his perception of the ideas to instinct: genius is “an instinct of quite a peculiar kind 
whereby the genius is urged to express in works that will endure that which he perceives and 
feels” (PP, II, 86).  But whereas human procreation is driven only by instinct, in the case of the 
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artist, instinct alone cannot account for the fruition of artistic works.  While human beings, in 
seeking to propagate the species, bear their offspring in and according to the world as will, thus 
affirming the will-to-live blindly (that is, without being influenced by pure knowledge), the 
aesthetic genius’ desire to create is not guided by the will—or, at least, not by the will alone.14  
What, then, moves the aesthetic genius to create?  Schopenhauer’s answer to this question, we 
find, is somewhat splintered, as the creative process seems to involve an interplay of the great 
intellect of the genius and the peculiar instinct that guides it.  But even granting that instinct 
instructs the creative process, I would argue that the aesthetic genius should still be understood 
as acting intentionally.  
It is true that even in the aesthetic genius, who has an excess of intellect, the will (and, in 
turn, instinct) predominates, and the true power of his knowledge is witnessed only in moments 
of inspiration.  As discussed above, knowledge is, in most instances, the servant of the will; thus 
most knowledge is tainted by the individuality (i.e., the individual will) of its subject: “through 
the subject’s disposition that is given once for all, we now have that infection that arises directly 
from the will and its mood of the moment and thus from the interests, passions, and emotions of 
the knower” (PP, II, 65).  More often than not, the whims of the will guide our knowledge of 
something, since our intellect is “poisoned by the will” (PP, II, 66).  And just as often our 
knowledge serves the will in such a way that it turns a blind eye to pure knowledge, or 
knowledge that is “purely objective” (PP, II, 65).  This is especially true of the knowledge 
underlying love, since love is an illusion that allows the will of the species to ensure its survival.  
While lovers “imagine they are advancing their own happiness” in their union with one another, 
                                                 
14 As discussed in Section 4, the will does appear to play some part in artistic creation.  Therefore, we 
cannot discount the will’s presence when considering what moves the aesthetic genius to create.  That 
said, Schopenhauer emphasizes the predominance of the intellect over the will in the creative process; this 
suggests that even if the will has a hand in artistic creation, it is a hand largely guided by the knowledge 
of the aesthetic genius. 
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“their actual aim is one that is foreign to themselves,” and thus their love turns out to be an 
“instinctive delusion” (WWR, II, 557).   
But the most perfect intellect, Schopenhauer claims, is one that is able to take on a purely 
objective perspective.  Such a perfect intellect “exceeds the necessary amount” demanded by the 
will; given this excess, “knowledge become[s] more or less an end in itself” for the individual 
who possesses it (PP, II, 68).  So, while it is the case that the aesthetic genius “works, as people 
say, from mere feeling and unconsciously, indeed instinctively,” his work is also guided by his 
intellect’s insight into the inner nature of things (WWR, I, 235).  Having apprehended the Idea of 
an object, he makes knowledge an end in itself and harnesses his intellect in such a way that it 
surpasses its position, its subjugation to the will; in so doing, the intellect of the aesthetic genius 
moves beyond the mere relations of things “in order to occupy itself in a purely objective way” 
(PP, II, 68).  His knowledge thus becomes detached from its intended purpose and assumes a 
new purpose—that is, it redirects itself away from the concerns of the will and towards the 
apprehension and representation of the will’s adequate objectifications.  
Here, then, we see the difference between love’s blind affirmation of the will-to-live and 
the aesthetic genius’ more intentional affirmation of the will-to-live.  In that all works of art stem 
from the aesthetic genius’ ability to engage in perceptual knowledge for prolonged periods of 
time, the aesthetic genius is able temporarily to leave the world as will behind and engage 
instead with pure representation.  As Schopenhauer puts it, a genius is “a man in whose head the 
world as representation has attained a degree of more clearness and stands out with the stamp of 
greater distinctness” (PP, II, 76).  The world as representation is the world of knowledge; hence 
the heightened intellect’s intimate engagement with this world. In light of his exclusive intimacy 
with the representational world and his appreciation of the same, the aesthetic genius desires to 
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give form, color, and content to his knowledge in the normal world of willing via works of art.  
In this desire, the genius consciously affirms the will-to-live, knowingly and intentionally 
working to represent the “immortal idea” he has perceived.  Unlike the blind striving that 
motivates sexual love and procreation, which does not recognize its own aim, the creative 
process is clearly a deliberate one.  The aesthetic genius, having gained knowledge of the true 
nature of the world surrounding him, reenters the world as will in order to create an object that 
secures immortality for his immortal insight. 
2.1 Children of Genius 
If it is the case that the aesthetic genius affirms the will-to-live by bringing forth a work 
of art that is meant to secure his immortality, what, then, should we make of his children?  Do 
works of art act, in and of themselves, as affirmations of the will-to-live? 
Nietzsche would be the first to answer this question with a blunt and definitive “no.”  As 
he notes in The Birth of Tragedy, Schopenhauer interpreted tragedy as a kind of “resignation” 
(BT, “Self-Criticism,” 6).  And Schopenhauer explicitly says as much, writing that “the tendency 
and ultimate intention of tragedy [is] a turning towards resignation, to the denial of the will-to-
live” (WWR, II, 437).  Hence we find, in the case of tragedy, an obvious instance in which 
Schopenhauer believes that art facilitates the denial of the will-to-live.  What is more, 
Schopenhauer hails tragedy as “the summit of poetic art, both as regards the greatness of the 
effect and the difficulty of the achievement,” and further argues that it is “very significant and 
worth noting that the purpose of this highest poetical achievement is the description of the 
terrible side of life” (WWR, I, 252).  Thus it seems, at first blush, that even if the aesthetic genius 
affirms the will-to-live through artistic creation, his children may very well betray him. 
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But tragedy, though favored, is not the only child borne by the aesthetic genius, and 
Schopenhauer readily admits that other art forms have dramatically different effects.  For 
instance, while Schopenhauer believes that painting can, at least in some instances, foster the 
denial of the will-to-live, sculpture cannot.  This is because “[i]n sculpture beauty and grace are 
the main thing; but in painting expression, passion, and character predominate; therefore just so 
much of the claims of beauty must be given up” (WWR, II, 419).  In that ugliness is sometimes a 
“suitable subject for painting,” but is never a suitable subject for sculpture, Schopenhauer 
concludes that “[f]rom this point of view, sculpture appears to be suitable for the affirmation of 
the will-to-live, painting for its denial” (WWR, II, 419).  From this we can glean that in aesthetic 
works in which beauty and grace predominate, works in which little ugliness and sorrow can be 
found, affirmation of the will-to-live is a likely effect. 
But an even more striking example of art acting as affirmation of the will-to-live is found, 
I would argue, in the case of music.  Schopenhauer holds this art form in the highest regard, for 
“music is by no means like the other arts, namely a copy of the Ideas, but [is] a copy of the will 
itself” (WWR, I, 257).  For this reason we cannot help but “attribute to music a far more serious 
and profound significance that refers to the innermost being of the world and of our own self” 
(WWR, I, 256).  Music, in its harmonic alternations between consonance and dissonance, 
captures the essence of the many movements of the will, both as we live it and as we perceive it 
in the world around us.  The interplay of the major and minor keys communicate the “two 
universal and fundamental moods of the mind, serenity, or at any rate vigour, and sadness, or 
even anguish” (WWR, II, 456).  But even when we recognize an intonation of pain and sorrow in 
music, we find it “neither physically painful nor even convention,” but “at once pleasing and 
unmistakable” (WWR, II, 456).  Thus, in its ability to make melancholy and grief not only 
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profound, but even pleasurable to the listener, music imparts that there are virtues to all aspects 
of lived existence.  This leads Schopenhauer to conclude that music “flatters only the will-to-
live, since it depicts the true nature of the will, gives it a glowing account of its success, and at 
the end expresses its satisfaction and contentment” (WWR, II, 457).  By flattering the will-to-live, 
music gives its listeners the sense that pain has as much beauty as pleasure; that sadness 
inevitably will be succeeded by serenity; and that life, the amalgamation of all that is good and 
bad and in-between, is ultimately worth living.  
In that the meaning and effects of art vary according to the art form being considered, it 
cannot be wholly or finally determined whether art itself is supposed to serve as an affirmation or 
a denial of the will-to-live.  Some art seeks to find and celebrate beauty where it lies; other art 
challenges us to contemplate the ugliness we prefer to avoid.  But what can be said about all of 
art is that its purpose is to comprehend the true nature of the lives we lead and the objects we 
encounter. In Schopenhauer’s words: 
We have to regard art as the greater enhancement, the more perfect development, 
of [life]; for essentially it achieves just the same thing  as is achieved by the 
visible world itself, only with greater concentration, perfection, intention, and 
intelligence; and therefore, in the fullest sense of the word, it may be called the 
flower of life.  If the whole world as representation is only the visibility of the 
will, then art is the elucidation of this visibility, the camera obscura which shows 
the objects more purely, and enables us to survey and comprehend them better.  
(WWR, 1, 266-267) 
 
All of art, regardless of the form it takes, allows us to gain knowledge of ourselves as 
willing beings and to better understand the willing world.  Only with this knowledge in 
hand can we begin to consider whether life is worth affirming or denying.  While the 
aesthetic genius affirms his own life by creating works of art that immortalize his insight, 
he cannot dictate that his insights have the same effects on the aesthetic contemplator.  
Instead, it is up to each individual to decide how to react to pure knowledge when 
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confronted by it; for only once we come to know ourselves and the world as will—that is, 
once we gain real self-knowledge—can we begin to weigh the value of life against its 
shortcomings.  As Schopenhauer says, “The will alone is; it is the thing-in-itself, the 
source of all those phenomena.  Its self-knowledge and its affirmation or denial that is 
then decided on, is the only event-in-itself” (WWR, I, 184).  
6 CONCLUSION  
 
If my reading is correct, we may be tempted to conclude that the aesthetic genius 
somehow occupies a position below the saint, at least in Schopenhauer’s estimation.  As 
Schopenhauer says, someone who affirms the will-to-live lacks “a deeper insight” of the world, 
i.e., that “constant suffering is essential to all life” (WWR, I, 283).  If the aesthetic genius is 
someone who affirms the will-to-live, then he does not achieve, by Schopenhauer’s own telling, 
the same insight into the world as the ascetic saint.  Were he to have the same insight, the 
aesthetic genius would no longer want to communicate the Ideas.  His own will, and his will to 
create, would be extinguished, and he would inevitably transition into sainthood.  Thus it seems 
as if the aesthetic genius, as one who affirms the will-to-live, stands inferior to the saint.  The 
aesthetic genius has a greater power of perception compared to others, and therefore is able to 
engage in aesthetic contemplation long enough to create a work of art.  But as someone who 
affirms the will-to-live, he, like the rest of us, lacks the insight into the nature of the world that 
the saint possesses, the insight that allows her to openly contradict the necessity of the will. 
“Necessity is the kingdom of nature; freedom is the kingdom of grace” (WWR, I, 404).  The 
ascetic saint flies to grace while aesthetic genius remains tied to nature; but, given that he alone 
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can communicate the truth of nature to the rest of us, the aesthetic genius shows unparalleled 
mastery over this kingdom.  
Yet while we can infer from this an important difference in standing of the two figures 
according to Schopenhauer’s pessimistic leanings, we can also see, lingering in Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetics, the kernel of an affirmative philosophy, one that presupposes and precipitates the kind 
of philosophy we will later see in Nietzsche.  Nietzsche, of course, sees Schopenhauer’s rankings 
of the aesthetic genius and the ascetic saint as being woefully misguided by his pessimism; what 
is more, Nietzsche identifies art as the crucial counterpoint to Schopenhauer’s claim that nothing 
that makes our existence worthwhile.  Indeed, Nietzsche argues that “the existence of the world 
is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon” (BT, “Self-Criticism, 5). But perhaps it is in 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetics that we find an enemy hiding among the ranks.  As Nietzsche slyly 
points out, it is what Schopenhauer railed against so fervently that proved most necessary for his 
philosophy:  
Above all, we should not underestimate the fact that Schopenhauer…needed 
enemies in order to keep in good spirits…he would have become ill, become a 
pessimist (for he was not one, however much he desired it), if deprived of his 
enemies, of Hegel, of woman, of sensuality and the whole will to existence, to 
persistence. (GM, III, 7) 
 
In that I have shown that, internal to Schopenhauer’s aesthetic philosophy, the aesthetic genius 
affirms the will to existence, that he acts in the interests of his own persistence, it seems that 
Nietzsche is not wrong here.  
“Art,” Nietzsche writes, “is the great stimulus to life,” for in art we encounter “[t]he will 
to immortalize” (TI, “Skirmishes,” 24; GS, V, 370).  For Nietzsche, we are right to try to seize 
this immortality, to embrace eternal recurrence, regardless of the suffering we endure.  So it is, I 
think, for Schopenhauer’s aesthetic genius, for the artist.  We may experience life as a troubled 
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dream, just as Schopenhauer claims, and we cannot know what dreams may come in the sleep of 
death that awaits us.  Yet that needn’t stop us from finding beauty and worth in the dreams we 
know; we can affirm the lives we lead, and choose to take our waking slow. 
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